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ABSTRACT 
 
 
     Often in today's business environments, data collected through great care and 
effort never transforms into actionable information and intelligence because 
organizations lack the tools or skills to apply modern practices. Too many well 
developed tools exist but are overlooked. Too many projects fail to account for their 
organization's social and cultural attributes. The result is information being discarded 
because it cannot be effectively leveraged.   
     This work examines a collection of business tools and technologies, goals, and 
behaviors in the context of how they affect information security policy and programs 
within the business.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Scenario 1 
Consulting an organization to decide on appropriate level of contingency planning  
     ACME Corporation's 1300 employees hardly consider themselves a large 
business. Their culture still carries many tendencies of their founding team despite 
three years of rapid growth and a recent merger which then doubled their size. As a 
growing company, ACME executives have focused on controlling costs and meeting 
the most basic demands of developing their core services and providing them to 
their customers. However, an internal outage last week left the company without 
email for two days. Customers are also becoming more savvy in their sales 
questions and want to know how ACME is protecting their records and assuring 
availability. These issues highlight the need for the company to review their critical 
data processing infrastructure and align it with the needs of a bigger enterprise.  
 
Scenario 2 
Developing a security policy for internal / COTS application 
     At B&L Company, an effort is underway to improve the security of applications 
which are used company wide. This includes many internally developed tools and 
off-the-shelf software suites - some of which are quite complex. Under this program 
senior management aims to better control the quality of custom applications and 
understand the security position of their purchased software. With luck, the improved 
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visibility and depth of coverage in these security policies will lead to performance 
improvements and opportunities for more efficient infrastructure investment.   
 
An Unlevel Playing Field 
     Security vulnerabilities in software systems could be viewed in economic terms 
as negative externalities. Whether introduced during coding, from insecure 
architectures, or through some other vector, bugs that challenge intended 
functionality or enable attackers typically are not part of the original statement of 
work. In this context, the software vendors consumed labor and operational 
resources to create their software products with an expected set of features. 
Eventually unintended functionality which could compromises the system's 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability comes to light. In this situation not only is an 
unplanned cost introduced, but the problem needs to be mitigated at the most effort 
intensive phase of its lifecycle. It also damages the developers’ credibility hurting 
future revenue. Such issues are pervasive in the software industry and represent a 
systemic problem.  
     No single factor is responsible for the present state of information technology 
security. Indeed, it is a very complex ecosystem. Over the past decade an 
unprecedented number of organizations have begun taking information security very 
seriously. For too many others it is still an enigma, a luxury that only big companies 
can afford, or a distant threat that seems as though it could never happen to them.  
     Although some facets of this domain are very new, many are as old as the 
information age itself. On a daily basis research uncovers better methods, more 
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efficient or robust algorithms, and alternative ways to apply technology to protect 
information assets. Meanwhile we still struggle with decades' old problems of 
managing the availability, accuracy, access to the data that drives the organizations 
efforts. Social forces such as politics, greed, entertainment, and curiosity play a 
significant role in the equation and are not even based in technical realms. The 
disparity of organizations adopting security practices and contributing forces is 
further compounded by the pace of change within information technology.  
     Even with industry wide improvements in software development practices, today's 
data security problems aren't going to disappear on their own. If the present state of 
data security was able to efficiently realize the costs of poor security, organizations 
would be on a natural path to fixing bugs early and design in sound security 
principles from the start. More often it follows a pattern of near term benefit with a 
delayed penalty. Much like an addictive drug, this model provides a poor incentive 
structure towards solution.  
     Interestingly, a concept borrowed from the world of public policy analysis shares 
some core correlations. Bardach summarizes key properties of market failure for a 
good or service as: 
 Making it hard to collect payment from all the potential beneficiaries 
 Making it hard to collect from the beneficiaries of consumption the true 
economic cost of making use for the good or service 
 Making it hard for consumers to know the true qualities of the goods or 
service they are acquiring  (Bardach 2009, p3)  
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Often times, market failure is used to rationalize a governing regulation, incentive, or 
policy to try to offset difficult to manage condition. These market failure properties 
apply well to the economics of software security vulnerabilities. Because damages of 
poor security occur throughout a system's use and can vary widely in value, the true 
economic impact is infeasible to calculate. Individuals whose data are being handled 
are rarely in the position to fund security efforts directly. Relatively simple software 
products are too complex for consumers to truly understand. Even when applications 
make their source code available, their workings are far from transparent without 
substantial analysis effort.   
 
Problem Statement 
     Problems that arise from overlooking modern business tools and methodologies 
affect the quality and soundness of organizational data security decisions. This 
frequently leads to unrecognized or under-appreciated risks to information assets 
and costs which are unplanned or fail to deliver on their intended benefit. It can allow 
an organization to believe that it is in a dramatically different strategic posture than it 
truly is. Organizations may also be hurt through missed opportunities to deliver 
better goods or services and to mitigate information vulnerabilities early.  
 
A solution would better equip decision makers with the right data and methods to 
manage data security consistently and efficiently in the unique context of their own 
organization.  
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Literature Review 
     This work focuses on the convergence of business processes and tools, 
information technology management, and data security. Each of which is a very 
active field with ongoing research and its own overwhelming volume of publications. 
A brief search limited to just this year's publications indexed in the EBSCO 
Academic Search Elite database returns over a thousand hits for "business process" 
and "business tool" as of October 2010. The phrase "information technology 
management" found 994 articles. Together, "data security" and "information security" 
matched nearly another two thousand hits. Industry wide, each of these domains is 
more heavily published than an individual could possibly keep up with.   
     Other research in the disciplines of project management, policy administration, 
risk analysis, management information systems, and others has explored many 
facets of these topics extensively. However my contribution aims to bridge some of 
their best practices into applied organizational data security cases. It would be 
infeasible to try to cover the full spectrum of modern business tools and 
methodologies, much less enumerate them within a security context. So the 
following will focus on a narrow selection of decision making, risk, and performance 
management tools. This selective review will include many recently formalized 
models, as well as some well established methods.     
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Methodology 
     This paper's framework starts with an introduction to some key organizational 
goals, information security challenges, and technologies which affect any business 
operating in the digital age. From there, a number of business tools are described 
and discussed in comparison and how they can be applied to data security topics. It 
covers basic decision making methods ranging from simple and cost based methods 
to more dynamic and subjective analysis. With risk management it addresses 
challenges of identifying what to manage and how to assure the right amount of 
effort is applied to this phase. Performance measurement is addressed for tangible 
criteria and 'non-measurable' abstract aspects. Finally, some aspects of how human 
and organizational behavior impact rational methodologies are highlighted.      
     In bridging business and information security challenges and tools, this work is 
unique in its scope and applied approach. Key objectives are to raise awareness of 
the range of business management tools currently available and demonstrate their 
applicability within the security domain. The outcome of which is to enable security 
professionals to more optimally and comprehensively address the operational needs 
of businesses.  
 
Business Goals 
     At the most basic dimension, businesses are formed as tools designed for 
generating profit. However, this simplified model falls short of recognizing the goals 
which will determine a business's success. Though start-ups and established 
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corporations are driven by individuals or boards in pursuit of wealth or prestige - real 
motivation is more abstract. In addition to the quest for an ideal profit margin, and 
sometimes even independent of profit, real world businesses exist as tools for 
solving real world problems.  
     Just as individual motivation thrives on factors other than money, organizations 
become energized through chasing common dreams, achievement, and institutional 
growth. For businesses that operates using any meaningful form of information, 
information security plays a number of enabling roles. No matter what the company 
produces as goods or services, staying in business means having access to an 
array of information artifacts.  
     Some artifacts, such as publications and information based products, have value 
outside the company. Others, like trade secrets, may need to be kept hidden for the 
company to remain viable. A loss or compromise of integrity to records of internal 
value, like customer contacts and transaction histories, would certainly hurt the 
organization's productivity as it expends effort to recover. By taking steps to protect 
these information assets from loss and having a plan in place for managing 
information security events, companies can better protect their core purpose.  
     Information security mechanisms may even offer opportunities to enhance the 
company's goods and / or services. In software development, undiscovered bugs are 
a frequent cause of both functional defects and security vulnerabilities. Developers 
may end up with more reliable software by improving code review standards for 
security. Designing an enterprise IT infrastructure with security principles in mind 
should lead to reduced downtime. Implementing an information system with robust 
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capabilities for handling different levels of access based on roles could even allow 
customers or business partners to have access to limited internal information. In 
these ways, information security could be used to improve or create new marketable 
competencies.     
     Similarly, internal operational procedures can benefit by adopting common and 
unified practices. Risk assessment emerges in many different efforts throughout an 
organization. If the assessment methods are kept fundamentally the same for 
managing project, financial, staffing, data security, and other business risks, the 
employee training and applied risk assessment exercises in separate efforts will 
strengthen practices throughout the company. Finally, developing a corporate 
culture that recognizes common practices and well defined policies which support 
core business goals will reflect the organization and ethical focus of the company.  
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CHAPTER 2. ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 
     Struggling with even the fundamentals of data security is common for 
organizations of all sizes. In small companies or independent business units, trained 
expertise is typically absent and efforts are ad-hoc, when they emerge at all. Larger 
organizations face many of the same difficulties plus the complications of unequally 
distributed talent and more complex data processing systems. This section will focus 
on challenges specific to classifying operational data, monitoring information 
systems, and aligning requirements to business goals.   
     The basis for data classification could be regulatory or voluntarily driven. 
Customer oriented data privacy laws are becoming more commonplace. Financial, 
government, and health industries, as well as anyone who handles credit card 
processing, are subject to ever growing sets of legal mandates. Non-public data may 
need to be restricted internally to prevent insider trading, limit its circulation, manage 
legitimate access, or any number of reasons. Yet classifying data poses some 
fundamental problems.  
 
Data Classification 
     Some types of organizations, particularly in financial industries, are expected to 
enforce separation of duties. In a software development setting, this principle could 
emerge through developers, testers, and system administrators each having non-
overlapping staff roles and reporting to different managers. More often though, the 
same individuals are responsible for developing, validating, implementing, and 
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supporting data management systems. Even if multiple roles are involved, quality 
assurance or peer reviewers would likely not have the resources to really 
understand many details of a system's data, users, and potential for unintended 
exposure. In-depth expertise of any given system is typically limited to fewer than a 
handful of individuals, distributed throughout one or more teams, or only available 
through third party support channels. When is comes to finding out if an information 
system contains sensitive data, there may not be a credible separate or independent 
party available.  
     Classifying data is subject to two different dimensions of consistency. The same 
data, when viewed by two different people, could be identified as meeting or not 
meeting the category's requirements. A common example of this is personally 
identifiable information - while a report keyed from customer numbers may not 
directly map to individuals, if the customer number mapping is available through 
another channel the customer data becomes transparent. Secondly the data itself 
may cover similar content, but inconsistent business rules could lead to inconsistent 
classification. For instance in a human resources department it may be common 
practice to post names and employee numbers together freely on internal reports. In 
another operational department the employee number could serve as a private login 
credential which is not to be shared. Here, the different classification of employee 
numbers could enable someone passing through HR to improperly use someone 
else's account to access internal systems.  
     Social or political pressures can also work against the proper classification of 
data because there is typically a measure of cost and effort associated with more 
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restrictive levels. When faced with an effort to figure out if a system is storing any 
sensitive customer data, management might be initially biased towards confirming 
that is does not. Or knowing that other projects would need to be cut to enable 
remedial security efforts, they may review the system less thoroughly or even act 
unethically and report that it has no sensitive information. In some situations a 
decision maker might mistakenly or naively assert incorrect system attributes. 
Imagine a sales consultant working to close a deal with an important client - when 
asked whether their solution has the security mechanisms in place to handle 
payment card sales transactions, the consultant's answer may differ from the 
developers.  
  
Monitoring 
     Monitoring information processing systems is another key facet of managing data 
security which is notoriously error prone. Similar to data classification, it is prone to 
political pressures. It also falls victim to difficulties stemming from funding, 
assumptions, configuration, and constantly shifting targets.  
     Human nature doesn't tend to favor bad news. It spreads virally throughout an 
organization leaving a trail of half true permutations and assumed causes and 
consequences. Often the social fallout takes longer to return to normal than the 
original issue itself. It is no wonder that data security incidents face a natural 
tendency to be addressed quietly and swept under the rug. Internally, raising the 
awareness of a data breach or ongoing critical vulnerability can be career limiting if it 
results in individuals getting blamed. A best-case response would be for 
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management to realize the incident as an opportunity to improve internal processes. 
External customers and business partners also tend to hold a negative stigma 
against organizations associated with reported data security incidents. Acting 
ethically and responsibly disclosing findings or incidents publicly can lead to 
significant costs and losses.  
     The first phase of many incident response plans involves identifying or detecting 
that an incident may have occurred. Effective monitoring is necessary trigger the 
well designed workflows that aim to keep operations running. Unfortunately it 
involves the continued effort of staff with very specialized knowledge. Manually 
reviewing logs is time consuming, tedious, and with luck, unlikely to turn up any 
problems. As such, this task tends to get offloaded to junior team members or 
overlooked entirely as budgets look for efficiency and people get busy. Monitoring 
logs, configurations, access rights, and functional parameters is prime territory for 
automation. Automation, however, can only evaluate known cases and it is 
impossible to account for all situations that will show up in real use. This can leave 
an organization placing too much reliance on automated monitoring facilities and not 
realizing the system's limitations for detection.  
     Modern information technology infrastructures frequently involve the services of 
multiple third party companies and complex tool sets. Ideally, these relationships 
would bring economy of scale for highly specialized business needs. In practice they 
also introduce opportunities for miscommunacation and lax accountability. If 
maintenance activities are managed by an outside group, the maintainers won't 
necessary have accounted for important details of data processing systems. With 
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incomplete information, automated monitoring could be set up for a system's web 
server and database, but miss a separate application log although thinking that the 
system is fully managed.  
     Relying on outside providers can also introduce maintenance support 
incompatibilities that impact efficient or comprehensive monitoring and detection. 
Third party maintainers may be relying on out of date tools, or tools which only work 
with a subset of the technologies deployed. Configuration and log monitoring tools 
require substantial customization to be optimized for a given environment. If the 
tools are deployed without the appropriate planning, expertise, or level of detail 
applied, they will not be able to deliver a suitable level of assurance to alert support 
staff to important issues. Furthermore, as data processing systems are upgraded, 
extended, and replaced, systems designed to monitor them also need modified to 
address their changing behavior. Without regular effort to keep synchronized, 
monitoring systems may discover that their target profile is no longer accurate.   
 
Requirements 
    The last class of organizational challenges covered here focuses on divining, 
dissimulating, or dealing with information security requirements. In one recent article 
the author highlights how the differences of perceived and actual risks plays into 
cloud based information services. (Gardner 2010) An organization's blindness to 
application vulnerabilities becomes especially problematic when they can no longer 
apply traditional mechanisms to secure their virtual parameters.  
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     Many information systems that support business operations are the result of 
years of organic growth. Even major commercial systems commonly are composed 
of bits and pieces of applications which have been assembled over time to deliver 
certain functionality. Security principles and their effective implementation vary 
widely among applications and systems - the organization may expect a much 
higher level of security capability than a tool was designed for. Another variation of 
this same challenge pertains to internally grown databases and applications. Well 
intended and technically savvy staff often develop tools to improve departmental 
productivity without understanding or addressing the security implications.  
     Even full time developers face challenges applying security principles. Security 
design and configuration items can be extremely detail oriented. Tying the detailed 
elements to high level requirements is necessary for coherent traceability. But if high 
level requirements do not address security designed in from the beginning, effort 
may never get allocated for flushing out security details. Alternately, a design may 
have high level security requirements defined but suffer from inconsistently 
implemented or interpreted detailed design specifications. A development framework 
helps to assure that requirements are reviewed and common standards get applied. 
But even in organizations with rigorous development lifecycle management it is 
common for some software to be created outside of that framework - typically just for 
one-off use, prototypes, or developer tools. Of course, if these applications work 
well, they get widely used and soon become mission critical.   
     Legacy systems can be the most cost prohibitive to retool to meet modern data 
security needs. With small organizations or highly competitive industries this can be 
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particularly problematic as investing in a secure solution puts the company in an 
uncompetitive position. For a company that has transitioned to mandating high 
assurance for data security, making even minor modifications to legacy systems can 
uncover preexisting security problems which suddenly become high-priority findings.  
     One final way that information security requirements can affect organizations is in 
the selection of mitigation mechanisms. Specifically, if the company doesn't know 
what their data security needs are they may invest in tools, technology, and 
infrastructure that does nothing to improve their security posture. In this manner, the 
risk is unnecessary expending resources. Perhaps even leaving important 
vulnerabilities unmitigated.   
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CHAPTER 3. BUSINESS TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Business Technology 
     Human cultures have developed any number of techniques to facilitate barter and 
commerce over the past ten thousand years or so. From the invention of the wheel 
and continuing discoveries through sail, steam, electric, and combustion powered 
transportation, improvements have extended the range, speed, capacity, safety, and 
efficiency of of moving goods. Our spoken and written languages grew, in part, to 
support property ownership, contracts, and enable transactions.  
     More advanced principles emerged over time leading to progressively more 
robust standards for accounting and dispute resolution. Through economics, we 
have learned ways to more accurately model how resources are valued, exchanged, 
and consumed. Investment is understood to have more than a zero sum potential. 
When two or more parties contribute jointly to an effort, they can achieve better 
results than if any single party had tried alone. With industrialization, society has 
found far greater capacity at producing goods and services through specialization.  
     The modern business technology landscape pulls every possible domain of 
knowledge in complex and interrelated ways. After thousands of years of 
refinements we can now perform incredibly precise calculations quickly and 
communicate practically anywhere at near instant speeds. Complex projects ranging 
from coding to construction can be effectively analyzed for feasibility and 
successfully coordinate among many independent groups, often spread across the 
globe. Financial and transactional records can be retained perpetually and accessed 
from from many places at once. Many barriers to conducting business that were 
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substantial even a generation ago have been made insignificant, or at least possible 
through technologies applied to business.      
 
Business Tools 
     Techniques and tools which are particularly applicable to information security are 
the focus of the next few sections. These are pulled from diverse bodies of 
knowledge and represent only a subset of the tools available. Here, several facets of 
performance measurement, risk management, and decision making concepts are 
described and analyzed as applied in an information security context.  
 
Performance Measurement 
     Information processing systems can be very difficult to describe in terms of 
organizational performance. They tend to have an abundance of functional metrics 
such as processing or storage capacity, number of transactions handled, and 
uptime. But these attributes do not directly translate to operational or strategic 
business value. Devices and practices intended to introduce or enhance information 
security mechanisms often suffer from a similar deficiency of meaningful measures.  
     In "Measuring the Value of Metrics" (Thurman, 2006), an IT security manager 
recounts his team's efforts in selecting just a handful of metrics for senior 
management. After discarding the previous manager's reporting methodology, his 
team choose to focus on the percentage of corporate workstations that meet the 
current Trend Micro and Microsoft SMS managed policies. Reporting from their IDS 
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was also provided - with the caveat that only an estimated 40% of their network was 
being monitored. This information, along with the more concrete measures like the 
number of tickets closed, was selected to support their overall security posture. It 
also expresses results in a manner that can be tracked over time and compared for 
further trend analysis.  
     Two general classes of measurements exist - a metric can be either tangible or 
abstract. As Thruman's experience illustrates, there are many potentially valid ways 
to describe an organization's effort and progress. Here, we will cover several specific 
methods of tangible and abstract measures that may apply to evaluating the 
performance of information security mechanisms and policies.  
     The most easily compared metrics tend to have precise and quantitative results. 
While there are certain applications which warrant advanced statistics or complex 
mathematical modeling, simple metrics are almost always a better choice. By 
applying the least complicated method of describing an attribute, the method and its 
result will be more transparently understood by a wider audience. Their is also less 
potential for human error in calculating or interpreting these results.  
     Counting is just about the simplest metric and it is very tangible. Alone or 
combined with a unit of time, it can be applied in a wide variety of security related 
measurements. How often does Alice log in to the reporting system? How many 
alarm conditions are being detected per hour? Which workstation has the most MP3 
files? It applies meaningfully to the number of transactions that succeed or fail, or 
the number of issues reported and closed. As long as the context is well defined, 
simple counting is very repeatable. 
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     Coverage is a natural extension of counting - by having a list of expected results 
and a list of observed results, the amount of overlapping elements are counted and 
expressed as a percentage of the ideal list. This class of metrics is discussed in in 
depth in Elizabeth Nichols's Beautiful Security Metrics chapter in Beautiful Security 
(Oram & Viega, 2009). There, she cites four coverage examples as they could have 
been used to detect an insider's abuse of information systems. She lists: 
 Percentage of applications or basic services ... whose access is managed 
by an authoritative system 
 Percentage of login accounts that are explicitly linked to a valid employee 
 Percentage of accounts or of employees whose access and entitlements 
are formally reviewed at least once a year 
 Percentage of group overlap (Oram & Viega, 2009, p46) 
By phrasing the target of coverage as a topic based in business rules and policy, 
these examples are well suited to highlight visible cases where the potential for 
abuse is high.   
     Time related metrics can be especially useful for tracking availability, incident 
detection, response, and resolution efforts. Uptime, both as perceived by an 
information system and by those using the system is an important part of user 
satisfaction and service level agreements. By regularly tracking the timing attributes 
of systems, support staff can get insight in to impending capacity limitations or more 
readily detect that something has changed and investigate the cause of an otherwise 
unknown event.  
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     In contrast to tangible metrics, abstract ones are imprecise and assume a degree 
of uncertainty. However, they are no less significant than more concrete measures. 
With the right questions, abstract metrics can improve the manageability of 
unmeasurable systems and policies.  
     Starting with a simple question such as, "How good is your organization's data 
security?" any nominal response (poor, excellent, even 'I don't know') produces 
some amount of information that can be applied towards an objective assessment. 
In a variety of domains, customer service is typically evaluated through targeted 
surveys. Customer service is a concept that is about as unmeasurable as they come 
- the same interaction could be perceived very differently by different customers and 
many external factors influence the experience. Yet through the lens of a large 
number of independent surveys, a reasonably accurate depiction can be found. 
     Spending can also tell a lot about performance in certain cases. Even if no other 
measurements are being tracked, following the money can help detect what is 
working, or what isn't being invested in. For instance, if their is a sudden increase in 
spending to maintain system patches or handle workstation security incidents, the 
situation probably warrants deeper investigation. Alternately, if no dollars are being 
allocated to security projects or training, there is a better than average chance that 
those activities are not occurring.  
     Another method described in Beautiful Security Metrics deals with inferring 
whether introducing some treatment to a process causes a statistically significant 
change to some measurable attribute (Oram & Viega, 2009). For instance, assume 
that a new password policy is to be published with a goal of reducing support calls to 
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reset login credentials. First a baseline of support call metrics would be collected. 
The policy would be published, advertised, and given an opportunity to show some 
effect. Then another set of support call metrics would be evaluated to determine if it 
has changed significantly from the baseline. If other environmental influences are 
accounted for and their is still a change, the data supports that it may be due to the 
policy change.  
     Other inferential sources which may offer alternate indications of performance 
include written policies, procedures, other internal documentation, and system logs. 
The organization's adopted policies and procedures are a reflection of their values 
as well as issues which are of high concern or may have come up before. Well 
planned and operated groups tend to demonstrate good organization throughout 
their companies. If policies are incoherent, missing, outdated, or not specifically 
tailored to the organization that is using them, it may indicate that they do not put 
much effort into the business's upkeep. Such good or poor organization can show up 
in project and design documents, or even in system log review and management 
efforts.  
     When considering the merit of abstract of tangible measurement criteria, it is 
important to choose attributes that can be matched up with business interests. For 
any measurement to be valuable it should be reliable repeatable to get results within 
an acceptable variance. The method of collecting data or performing the 
measurements tasks should also follow a consistent process for the results to be 
comparable over time. Often, a member of the same group is responsible for 
collecting and publishing the performance metrics. As they may not be able or willing 
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to represent unbiased data, independent audits should be considered depending on 
the criticality of information. Finally, any metric that is used for making business 
decisions should be used with a good background of the origin and limits of the data 
set. If the metrics do not provide a logical foundation for the decision that they 
support, different data might need to be explored.     
 
Risk Management 
     Risk is central to many aspects of an organization's operation, but it holds an 
inseparable relationship with security. For our purposes, risk can be generally 
defined as a potential for loss. In contrast, information security aims to regulate 
potential losses related to information and data processing assets. Managing risk is 
a process which is often highly individualized to the needs of an organization. Even 
when adopting a generic risk management framework, the company's tacit 
interpretations, internal culture, and unique operating environment affect their 
process.  
     In risk-informed Decision Making, the authors trace the origin of risk to ancient 
maritime challenges. They discuss the nature of risk as an effort to answer the 
questions of, "What can go wrong? How likely is it? What are the outcomes or 
consequences if it occurs?" (Ayyub, Prassinos, & Etherton, 2010) Their work 
presents a model for evaluating probability and impact of consequences as 
dimensions to reduce failures in mechanical systems.  
     Another study touts the benefits of their new framework in managing risk for 
records management settings. By their method, risks are first categorized as natural 
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events, human activities, or technical risks. Probability and impact are assigned 
through the use of a survey to determine weights and priorities for each identified 
risk. Interestingly, this study noted in closing that their participants were aware of 
general risk management methods but often did not have any resources budgeted 
for risk management activities (Soon-Jae & Hye-Kyung, 2008).    
     Whether the measure of frequency is once in 100 years or one in 100,000 units 
and the likely outcome is rated in hours of effort or fatalities and long-term 
environmental impact, these two approaches to risk management targeting very 
different audiences are fundamentally the same. Variations of these same risk 
models abound for information security problems ranging from small projects to 
elements of enterprise wide development lifecycle methodologies. Even so, 
organizations generally have a hard time doing risk analysis exercises well. These 
next few paragraphs address specific topics which often undermine effectively 
managing risk. 
     How can you keep something safe if you don't know what it is? Identifying what to 
protect seems like a first logical step in developing a protection strategy. However 
this basic activity often overlooked entirely or only fully realized late in the effort. 
Accurately describing the nature of digital assets can be challenging because many 
different roles need to reach a common understanding of it. Business analysts may 
know the value of certain data, but not its technical attributes or the capabilities of 
the systems that use it. Operational staff might be the best to define who needs 
access to what data to keep customers happy. Developers have the best insight of 
what is really in any given data set. Sometimes extensive and focused discussion is 
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needed to realize sensitive data which could expose the company to financial loss is 
being published to operators who don't even want to see it.  
     While failing to accurately describing assets is a sin of omission, identifying 
threats is challenging in different ways. Threats can be misidentified through 
ineffective templates, irrational bias or optimism, or simply by being evaluated by the 
wrong group. Fires, floods, earthquakes, and power outages are all well documented 
events, but many data security threats change over time. If a business is well 
enough organized to have a standard reference of common data security threats, 
they could easily end up missing threats that are not on their common list or spend 
time unnecessarily evaluating threats which truly don't apply. Going online and 
adopting the first threat template that shows up in a search may also lead to a poor 
threat analysis. Often individuals will intuitively perceive the potential of threats 
without any real basis. While this may be well intentioned, it could result in designing 
robust protection against data leakage but leaving data backups untested and 
unrecoverable. In other cases, real and valid threats may end up being dismissed as 
improbable. Finally, not all professionals have the appropriate background for 
evaluating information threats. A Corporate Finance Officer would probably do a 
poor job of accurately assessing threats to information processing systems because 
his or her expertise is biased differently.     
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Decision Making 
     Ultimately, after taking the effort to collect data and analyze performance and risk 
considerations, an organization's goal is to apply that information towards making 
better decisions. Often times the accumulated information doesn't get effectively 
managed to enable optimal choices. This section discusses several methods of 
modeling the available information and using it to form a sound basis for decisions. 
     Cost Benefit analysis can be used to determine if a process change is worth 
implementing or a risk mitigation effort will likely save money. In its simplest form, an 
project evaluator adds up the expected costs for one total and the anticipated 
benefits for a second total. If the project costs more than the benefit that it is planned 
to deliver, the data does not support pursuing that solution. 
     Often times, a project's benefit is only realized over time - a Cost Benefit analysis 
can be revised to take periods of time into account. In figuring the Payback Period, 
both benefits and costs may be expressed in terms of dollars per year, quarter, 
month, or other relevant time frame. As an illustration, consider a company looking 
in to spending $50,000 on a centralized enterprise authentication system when they 
anticipates that it will save $10,000 a month in improved productivity and reduced 
support calls. Payback Period is calculated simply by dividing the total cost by the 
total benefit per period. For this case, at five months the monthly savings will have 
broken even with the initial expense of the system.     
     When comparing several potential systems, tools, or mitigation activities to direct 
resources to, their relative values can often be expressed in terms of a Return on 
Investment. This value is calculated by starting with a project's expected total benefit 
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and subtracting its total cost. This result is then divided by the total cost to get a 
percentage return on the investment. From this metric, the option with the greatest 
return can be easily identified. However, note that the largest percentage return may 
not necessarily reflect the biggest cost return. 
     Cost benefit, payback period, and return on investment valuations get more 
complicated if the time involved increases. For short term calculations, cases where 
the time involved is one year or less, changes in the value of money over time can 
usually be ignored. With longer time ranges and large dollar amounts, calculations 
should account for the time-value of money too. Typically this involves adjusting 
future dollar values to present value estimates. 
     To calculate the present value of a monetary amount, you will need to make an 
assumption about an interest rate to use for comparison. The actual factors to 
consider in picking an interest rate depend heavily on specific situations and will not 
be covered in depth here. The following example follows the same notation as in the 
MindTools.com "Net Present Value (NPV) & Internal Rate of Return (IRR)" reference 
(mindtools.com). Starting with a future dollar amount and an interest rate, the 
present value is calculated as follows. 
  Present Value (PV) = Ct / (1+r)t 
Where Ct is a dollar amount in t future periods, r is the interest rate, and t is the 
number of future periods. 
 
Applied to an example, a system that costs $45,000 now and will result in saving 
$10,000 a year for five years could be valued as follows. 
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  Initial Cost       ($45,000) 
  Present value of first year savings:      $9,708.74 
  Present value of second year savings:   $9,425.96 
  Present value of third year savings:  $9,151.42 
  Present value of fourth year savings:  $8,884.87 
  Present value of fifth year savings:   $8,626.09 
   
   Total Present Value Savings   $45,797.07 
 
Here, a decision which may have intuitively appeared favorable by $5000 at five 
years has a much smaller time adjusted benefit. With only a slight change in the 
assumed interest rate, this investment would perform at a loss.  
     More advanced decision making models can be applied to situations where 
uncertain outcomes or individual preference are important criteria. Diagramming a 
strategic question structured as a decision tree visually maps out the evaluated 
options. Starting with a root question, first level branches are drawn for each broad 
class of solution. Next, each first level node is considered and child branches are 
developed enumerating each variation. This process is repeated until the evaluator 
is comfortable with the depth of the decision tree. After the tree is created, likely 
outcomes for each branch are added and assigned a probability based on previous 
data or best guess. By calculating the relative value for each outcome node of the 
tree, the evaluator can choose the best valued solution based on the available 
information.  
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     Grid analysis excels in cases where an ideal solution would meet several 
attributes. The evaluator's preferences are reflected in the weights assigned to each 
evaluation criteria - this method would correctly generate different outcomes for 
evaluators with different interests. A new column is placed for each factor being 
considered and each option is assigned a row. Next, the evaluator decides on how 
well each factor is satisfied by each solution - often the cell scores 0 if the factor is 
not satisfied and would range up to 5 for a very good match. By adding up the total 
scores for each solution row, the largest total identifies the best overall match for 
that set of factors.   
     Often, the choices of others have a very real impact on the outcomes of your own 
decisions. Game theory concepts can be applied to strategic business decisions in 
efforts to model the best course of action for others and understand how they may 
respond to your own choices. Two main game models are typically considered. In 
simultaneous move games, all players disclose their decisions at the same time. 
Otherwise players take turns considering and exercising their choices in sequential 
move games. To evaluate a simultaneous game scenario, a table is constructed 
depicting all possible options for each player. Then the likely payoffs are figured for 
each player at each outcome. Analyzing the results of this table can provide insight 
into what choices do or do not make sense for both players. Outcomes for 
sequential games are better mapped to trees identifying the possible choices for 
each player at each turn. Due to the complexity of applying this method to real life 
situations, the goal is often just to evaluate the next three or four likely moves. Most 
often, this is already a deeper strategic foresight than the other player is considering. 
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     Borrowing another formalized method from financial domains, real options 
analysis offers a framework for assigning present value to future potential choices. 
As described on Wikipedia, "A real option itself, is the right - but not the obligation - 
to undertake some business decision; typically the option to make, abandon, 
expand, or contract a capital investment." (Real options valuation)  
 
     One common thread through these diverse decision models is that the perceived 
benefits of security policies, controls, and risk mitigations have a large effect on the 
decision model outcome. Even a small change in assumptions can lead to 
substantially different results. There continues to be a growing body of documented 
security incidents, but the data is still too sparse and unreliable to draw meaningful 
projections from. Applying historical data to current information security systems 
faces challenges from changing technological and legal environments too. With 
more regulations going into effect and constantly evolving software and threats, data 
from an incident only months ago may not be a valid source for predicting potential 
losses.  
     Unfortunately, even the cost of a solution is not likely to be known accurately. 
One author prominently identifies a common software sales trend of offering a low 
initial price tag for a solution but having high support and maintenance costs 
(Pendergraft & Blakely, 2010). A total cost for a security device or management 
system may need to include licensing, training, implementation, and ongoing 
support.   
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CHAPTER 4 INDIVIDUAL & ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
Individual and Organizational Behavior 
     One of the most fascinating works reviewed while creating this paper is a case 
study dealing with implementing a performance measurement methodology at a 
bank. That paper, published in 1988, discusses efforts at the bank over a period of 
five years. Many of their technical challenges are still applicable today - some even 
more so as the expectations for service level agreements have become stricter. But 
the article is more remarkable in the frequency of times that it alludes to changes in 
the organizational culture. Their framework for service level agreements was created 
so that for the services to be provided, responsible individuals from the departments 
providing and consuming the service needed to be identified and work out the 
agreement details together. This provided increased responsibility for the resource 
consumer and promoted communication. Then upon realizing the benefit of the 
business relationship, users gained confidence in the process and measurement 
efforts. One of the study's key observations was that for the process to be 
successful, not only does it need strong senior management buy-in, but the 
organization needs to go through the effort of learning the process on their own 
(Singleton, Mclean, & Altman, 1988).  
     Not all business tools are appropriate for any given situation, similarly, not all 
business tools may be a good fit for a specific organization, or even an individual. 
For decisions which are strongly influenced by political pressures, adopting an 
analytical decision model could be ineffective. If the CEO has decided that the 
company needs to have more firewalls, or a high profile customer only wants to get 
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their reports over a certain vendor's VPN client and encrypted with a specific 
program, other requirements and processes may need to yield. Even determining an 
acceptable level of risk can be difficult. One study aimed to quantify an 
organization's general risk tolerance through a set of mock scenarios provided to 
company managers. Their results illustrated wide differences in how managers rated 
the scenarios, and frequently even identified that the same managers were 
inconsistent with their risk ratings (Walls, 2005).    
     Often times, people do not behave rationally at all. Escalation of commitment is a 
phenomenon where individuals continue to drive effort and resources into a project 
that is not reasonably likely to succeed. Instead of cutting their losses or looking to 
salvage parts of the project, this response makes the loss more costly. Status quo 
bias refers to a tendency to avoid change. Decision making tends to become more 
difficult as more options are presented. In a 2009 study, these three factors were 
brought together to help identify their impact on complex decision making. Here, 
participants generally tended to make good choices when a project was clearly 
failing and only one or two alternatives were available. As the number of alternatives 
increased though, participants were more likely to continue on the original less 
favorable project investment path (Fox, Bizman, & Huberman, 2009). This tendency 
is especially dangerous in the context of data security projects where there may be 
very many evaluation methodologies, services, and mitigation options to consider. 
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CHAPTER 5. CLOSING DISCUSSIONS 
Scenarios Revisited 
     There is no best solution for either of the opening scenarios. However the real 
and complex issues faced with ACME Corporation and the B&L Company can apply 
the techniques and considerations here to approach their challenges with a better 
understanding. By focusing on the goals and needs of their respective businesses, 
they can construct a coherent plan for identifying and prioritizing their information 
security needs and help others apply better business tools too.  
Conclusions 
     Even though information assurance is still an emerging field, many information 
security challenges resemble those of other domains or can be approached through 
common techniques. This work reviewed research, case studies, business tools, and 
methodologies originating from other fields but which can be applied to information 
assurance objectives to better enable organizations. It began with an introduction to 
some key organizational goals, information security challenges, and technologies 
which affect any business operating in the digital age and describes a number of 
business tools and how they can be applied to data security topics.  
     It covers basic decision making methods ranging from simple and cost based 
methods to more dynamic and subjective analysis. With risk management it 
addresses challenges of identifying what to manage and how to assure the right 
amount of effort is applied to this phase. Performance measurement is addressed 
for tangible criteria and 'non-measurable' abstract aspects. Finally, some aspects of 
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how human and organizational behavior impact rational methodologies are 
highlighted.   
     While no operational performance measurement is universally ideal, designing a 
portfolio of measurements which are closely related to business interests can 
identify real threats. They can also set the baseline for improvement if similar data 
can be consistently tracked over time. Risk management is an art which continues to 
be practiced irregularly, however its penalty is that discovering risks, flaws, and 
vulnerabilities after the fact is very costly. Decision making methods can be tailored 
to a variety of needs and are closely interrelated with the other concepts here. Every 
method has limitations though, and the tendency for small changes in assumptions 
to have a disproportionate affect on the outcomes is amplified by the complexity and 
uncertainty of information assurance scenarios.  
     In bridging business and information security challenges and tools, this work 
raises awareness of the range of business management tools currently available 
and demonstrate their applicability within the security domain. Through improved 
awareness, decision makers can view their needs, challenges, and available 
solutions differently. The outcome of which is to enable security professionals to 
more optimally and comprehensively address the operational needs of businesses.
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